One might conjecture that the superiority of tournaments over piece rates may not survive under liquidity constraints. Tsoulouhas and Vukina (1999) and Marinakis and Tsoulouhas (2009) have proved that the optimality of tournaments over piece rates can break down when the risk-neutral principal is subject to a limited liability (bankruptcy) constraint, which limits the payments a principal can make, provided that the liquidation value of the principal's enterprise is sufficiently small. This is so because tournaments increase payments in unfavorable states, but these are the states in which the limited liability constraint comes into play. The intuition is that contracts with risk neutrality and limited liability for the principal look very much like those that would have been obtained with risk aversion. In other words, if the principal is concerned about the allocation of profit across states, he will no longer offer insurance against common shocks via tournaments and will resort to piece rate contracts or fixed performance standards. This paper investigates the optimality of tournaments over piece rates when the agent, instead, is subject to a liquidity constraint which introduces ex post limitations on the minimum payment the agent can accept or the maximum penalty that can be imposed on him (Innes 1990 (Innes , 1993a . The liquidity constraint prevents the principal from compensating the agent by an amount smaller than a predetermined level in all states of nature.
The models used by Lazear and Rosen (1981) , Green and Stokey (1983) and others allow the payments to the agents to be negative. In particular, under both the piece rate and the tournament payment schemes, if the agents produced a sufficiently low output they would usually have to pay the principal. Thus, according to the standard literature, if the production of an agent is sufficiently low the principal will penalize the agent by imposing a negative compensation and acquire whatever output the agent produced. This is certainly inconsistent with what we observe in reality.
The liquidity constraint is partly an institutional constraint on contracts. It is imposed by law for several industries in numerous countries. Such legislation aims at removing the burden of excessive penalties imposed on agents for negative outcomes beyond their control, rather than at maximizing social welfare. However, a liquidity constraint for the agent may alter the choice the principal makes between tournaments and absolute performance contracts. This can be due to a number of reasons. Some of these reasons are in favor of tournaments and some are in favor of piece rates. First, by increasing payments to the agents in unfavorable states, tournaments are more likely to satisfy tight liquidity constraints for the agents. Second, by providing insurance, tournaments may satisfy the liquidity constraints for the agents without paying rents to them. This is so because tournaments increase the compensation to the agents in unfavorable states but reduce the payments in favorable states. By contrast piece rates may pay the agents ex ante rents when the liquidity constraints are tight (i.e., when the minimum required payment to the agents is high), which reduces the principal's profit. If piece rates pay ex ante rents to the agents, they could be dominant over tournaments from the principal's perspective only if implemented effort under piece rates were sufficiently higher. But, in general, tournaments allow the principal to implement higher-power incentives than piece rates, which enhances the dominance of tournaments. Third, agents may be unable to pay for insurance especially in low states of nature if the liquidity constraints are tight, which works against tournaments. Fourth, the attitude of the principal and the agents toward risk may change. Liquidity constraints may make the agents more tolerant to risk, in the sense that if the agents know that their liability is limited, they may become indifferent among the range of states over which the liquidity constraint is binding. 4 On the other hand, the liquidity constraints for the agents are expected to make the principal care about the allocation of payments and, hence, profit across states to satisfy the liquidity constraints and ensure agent participation. When the principal becomes less tolerant to risk, while agents simultaneously become more tolerant to risk and, therefore, they are not willing to pay enough for insurance, the principal may find it less profitable to offer insurance to the agent through a tournament and may resort to piece rates again. Thus, in all, it is not a priori clear if tournaments, which are normally superior over piece rates when production is subject to common shocks, maintain their superiority under liquidity constraints for the agents.
Our analysis shows that, surprisingly, in the presence of sufficient common uncertainty a principal contracting with risk averse agents will prefer to offer a tournament even when agents are liquidity constrained. This finding is diametrically opposite to the result for the case when the principal, instead, is subject to limited liability. The rationale for this result follows directly from the discussion above. It turns out that by providing insurance against common shocks through a tournament, so that payments to the agents in unfavorable states increase and payments in favorable states decrease, the principal can satisfy tight liquidity constraints for the agents without paying any ex ante rents to them while simultaneously providing them with higher-power incentives than under piece rates. The individual rationality constraints for the agents are always binding under tournaments, whereas under piece rates they are non-binding (that is, the agents receive ex ante rents) when the liquidity constraints for the agents are really tight (that is, when the minimum payment required to satisfy the liquidity constraints is high). This finding establishes our claim that the principal can satisfy tight liquidity constraints for the agents without paying any ex ante rents to them under tournament. Our second claim, that the principal can implement higher-power incentives under tournament, is facilitated by the fact that the piece rate contract cannot be defined for a piece rate larger than one (in the sense that the principal would not make an offer such that marginal cost exceeded marginal revenue) whereas the tournament is defined for a larger bonus factor. The larger the minimum payment satisfying an agent's liquidity constraint, the higher the power of incentives the principal provides. In other words, the principal counterbalances the increase in the base payment, which is required to satisfy the liquidity constraint, with higher-power incentives in order to curb agent rents and in order to reduce the likelihood that output is low. Tournaments provide the principal with added flexibility in the determination of this power when the liquidity constraints are really tight. 5 The empirical application that stems from our analysis is that firms should adopt relative performance evaluation via tournaments over absolute performance evaluation via piece rates regardless of whether the agents are liquidity (wealth) constrained or not. This finding enhances the generality of the results obtained in Lazear and Rosen (1981) , Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) . For instance, in the case of processor companies contracting with farmers who most often are liquidity constrained, processors need not fear that the farmers' liquidity issues detract from the superiority of tournaments. 6 Processors have been using tournaments for decades, especially with chicken growers, and there has been lots of mostly anecdotal evidence that farmers complain about such payment schemes in the presence of wealth constraints. Last but not least, note that similar to Lazear and Rosen (1981) , Green and Stokey (1983) , Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Malcomson (1984) we are not looking for the optimal contract, instead, we contrast the efficiency properties of absolute to relative performance evaluation by comparing cardinal tournaments to piece rates the way they are used in practice. 7 Section 2 presents our model and Sect. 3 presents the benchmark case without liquidity constraints with mostly known results in the literature. Section 4 presents our results when the agents are liquidity constrained and Sect. 5 determines the dominant compensation scheme. Section 6 extends the analysis by relaxing the assumption of risk-aversion for the agents. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A presents the main results of a representative numerical analysis. Appendix B presents the results of an analysis if common uncertainty were relatively low.
Model
A principal signs a contract with n homogeneous agents. 8 Each agent i produces output according to the production function x i = a + e i + η + ε i , where a is the agent's known ability, e i is his effort, η is a common shock and ε i is an idiosyncratic shock. The idiosyncratic shocks, ε i , and the common shock follow independent Footnote 5 continued to the benchmark case in Lazear and Rosen (1981) , Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) , and tournaments are optimal under sufficient common uncertainty. 6 Wealth constraints can certainly be a concern in contracts for salesmen as well.
7 Kim (1997) analyzes a setting with a risk neutral principal and a single risk neutral agent whose liability is limited. He shows that the optimal contract is a bonus contract in which the principal and the agent share the output, and the agent receives an additional fixed bonus only when output is greater than some predetermined level. We differ from Kim because in our model there are multiple agents who are risk-averse and their activities are subject to common uncertainty. Also see footnote 12 below. 8 Agent heterogeneity has been examined in a number of recent papers. In a model similar to ours, Theilen (2003) examines optimal piece rate contracts in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. consider CEO contests that are open to heterogeneous outsider contestants. Mathews and Namoro (2008) examine the entry choice of heterogeneous agents over tournaments with different prize levels. Konrad and Kovenock (2010) examine discriminating contests with stochastic contestant abilities. Kolmar and Sisak (2007) analyze discriminating contests among heterogeneous contestants. Tsoulouhas and Marinakis (2007) analyze ex post agent heterogeneity to make the point that agent heterogeneity compromises the insurance function of tournaments. Instead, Riis (2010) , where the agent's coefficient of absolute risk aversion is set equal to 1 for simplicity. The cost of effort is measured in monetary units. Each agent has a reservation utility − exp(−u), where u is arbitrary (zero or positive).
Piece rates and tournaments without liquidity constraints
We start by deriving the optimal contractual variables for the piece rate and the tournament without liquidity constraints for the agents. We assume that the total production disturbance, η + ε i , follows a normal distribution with zero mean and variance equal to c/ √ 2π, and the idiosyncratic shock, ε i , follows a normal distribution with zero mean and variance equal to d/ √ 2π . 9
3.1 Piece rates
The piece rate contract (R) is the payment scheme in which the compensation to the i th agent is w i = b R +β R x i , where (b R , β R ) are the contractual variables to be determined by the principal. The principal determines the optimal values of these parameters by backward induction. Thus, the principal calculates each agent's expected utility
To ensure the compatibility of the contract with agent incentives to perform, the principal calculates the effort level that maximizes (1). First order conditions yield 10
To ensure the compatibility of the contract with agent incentives to participate, the principal selects the value of the base payment, b R , that satisfies the agent's individual rationality constraint with equality so that the agent receives no rents but still accepts the contract. The agent's individual rationality constraint satisfies EU R = − exp(−u), where EU R is determined by (1) and (2). Solving for b R implies
Thus, by choosing the piece rate β R , the principal can precisely determine the agent's effort because the agent will optimally set his effort according to (2). In addition, by setting b R in accordance with (3) the principal can induce agent participation at least cost. That is, agent incentives to perform are only determined by the piece rate β R , whereas agent incentives to participate are determined by the base payment b R . Given conditions (2) and (3) the principal maximizes his expected total profit
The solution to this problem satisfies
Condition (3) then implies
Given conditions (5) and (4) expected profit per agent is
3.2 Tournaments
The cardinal tournament (T) is the payment scheme in which the compensation to each agent is determined by a relative performance evaluation. Specifically,
, where x is the average output obtained by all agents and (b T , β T ) are the contractual variables to be determined by the principal. 11 Under a tournament the agent's expected utility is
The effort level that maximizes (8) satisfies
Further, the individual rationality constraint EU T = − exp(−u) implies
Then, given conditions (9) and (10), the principal maximizes expected total profit
The solution to the principal's maximization problem satisfies
therefore,
Given (12) and (11) expected profit per agent is
By comparing (4) to (14) it can easily be shown that
that is, tournaments are superior when total uncertainty is large relative to the idiosyncratic uncertainty (equivalently, when common uncertainty is relatively large) and when the number of agents is large. This is so because tournaments eliminate common uncertainty but they add the average individual noise of others. It is also straightforward to show that b T > b R and β T > β R . The rationale behind the first inequality is that the expected bonus payment under tournament is zero, whereas that under piece rate is positive. Therefore, agents expect to be compensated for effort through the base payment in a tournament. The intuition behind the second inequality is that the principal implements higher-power incentives when common uncertainty is removed from the responsibility of the agent under tournament. By comparing effort under piece rates in (2) to that under tournaments in (9), it follows that effort under tournaments is larger provided that common uncertainty is sufficiently large, that is, [n/(n − 1)]d < c, which is a prerequisite for tournaments to be superior to begin with. Specifically,
Piece rates and tournaments with liquidity constraints
Next we turn to the case with liquidity constraints for the agents. The liquidity constraint is
where w is the minimum permissible payment. The liquidity constraints for the agents necessitate a support for the production shocks which is bounded below and above. The support must be bounded below so that in the worst possible output state the liquidity constraints are still satisfied (obviously they cannot be satisfied with an output space which is unbounded below). For a similar reason, the support must be bounded above to eliminate the case when the payment under tournament is below the minimum required to satisfy the liquidity constraint when average output is unbounded above. 12 With bounded support for the production shocks one might expect that the First Best is always implementable by punishing the agent severely for outcomes outside the support (see p. 140 in Bolton and Dewatripont 2005) . Note, however, that the liquidity constraints of the agents prevent severe punishment of them. The requirement of bounded support eliminates unbounded distributions such as the normal, which we used in Sect. 3 (and is typically used in the literature for the setting without liquidity constraints). The normal distribution is one of the assumptions that are made in order to obtain a closed form solution for the case without liquidity constraints. Further, a truncated normal distribution provides neither a closed form solution nor a numerical one. However, we were able to obtain significant insight through a numerical analysis by assuming that the idiosyncratic and the common shocks follow independent uniform distributions, in which case the sum of these shocks follows a triangular distribution. Specifically, the idiosyncratic shocks, ε i , follow independent uniform distributions with support [−d, d] , and therefore, the total production shock, v i ≡ ε i + η, follows a triangular distribution with density f (·), the support of which is assumed to be [−c, c] with zero mean. 13 The following lemmata apply to piece rates and tournaments with liquidity constraints.
Lemma 1 Under piece rates, when the agents are subject to liquidity constraints in addition to individual rationality constraints, at least one of the individual rationality and the liquidity constraints for each agent binds depending on the values of parameters w, u, a and c.
Proof First note that if both constraints were non-binding, then, the principal would reduce the payments to the agent until one of the two constraints became binding (that is, until the agent received no rents in an ex ante or in an ex post sense). As shown in Sect. 3, solving without the liquidity constraint for each agent (in which case the individual rationality constraint is obviously binding) implies that the contractual variables (b R , β R ) satisfy conditions (6) and (5), respectively, and therefore the payment w i may or may not satisfy the liquidity constraint in all states depending on the values of parameters w, u, a and c. Therefore, when the individual rationality constraint is binding, the liquidity constraint is binding or non-binding (the latter when w is relatively low). Solving without the individual rationality constraint (in which case the liquidity constraint is obviously binding in the lowest possible state) implies that the payments to the agent may or may not satisfy the individual rationality constraint depending on the values of parameters w, u, a and c again. Therefore, when the liquidity constraint is binding the individual rationality constraint is binding or non-binding (the latter when w is relatively large).
Lemma 2 Under tournaments, when the agents are subject to liquidity constraints in addition to individual rationality constraints, and assuming that the regularity condition a > [n/(n − 1)]d holds, the individual rationality constraint for each agent is always binding and the liquidity constraint for each agent is binding or non-binding depending on the values of parameters w, u, a and d.
Proof First, similar to Lemma 1, the two constraints cannot simultaneously be nonbinding. Solving without the individual rationality constraint (in which case the liquidity constraint is obviously binding in the lowest possible state) implies that b T = w +β T d. This is so because
if the number of agents is sufficiently large
To maximize this expected profit the principal chooses the maximum β T that satisfies the individual rationality constraint with equality so that the agent accepts the contract. Therefore, the individual rationality constraint is always binding. As shown in Sect. 3, solving without the liquidity constraint (in which case the individual rationality constraint is obviously binding) implies that the contractual variables (b T, β T ) satisfy (13) and (12), respectively, and therefore the payment w i may or may not satisfy the liquidity constraint in all states depending on the values of parameters w, u, a and d. Therefore, when the individual rationality constraint is binding, the liquidity constraint is binding or non-binding (the latter when w is relatively low).
Note that the regularity condition a > [n/(n − 1)]d requires that agents are of sufficiently high ability. The proof of Lemma 2, then, shows that the principal's profit is increasing in the bonus factor β T . The rationale why the individual rationality constraint is always binding for the tournament case but not for the piece rate case is that profit is decreasing in the piece rate β R . Therefore, unlike the tournament case in which the principal benefits by increasing the bonus factor β T until it yields no rents to the agent, in the piece rate case the principal may prefer to provide the agent with rents in order to increase his profit. Thus, there is a fundamental difference between tournaments and piece rates in this respect, which drives the results in our paper.
Piece rates
We start by analyzing the piece rate case. The piece rate scheme can be written as
As Lemma 1 indicates, the individual rationality constraint can be binding or not. Because of this, the procedure for determining the contractual variables is somewhat different than the one we followed above for the case without liquidity constraints (without liquidity constraints the individual rationality constraints are always binding). With liquidity constraints, we determine the base payment b R through these constraints, and the piece rate β R from the profit maximizing condition. Then we check whether this solution satisfies the individual rationality constraints.
Clearly, if the payment satisfies the liquidity constraint (16) in the lowest possible state, then, it satisfies the constraint in all states because the payment scheme is increasing in the state. Therefore, if the constraint is binding in the lowest state, then it is non-binding in all states. From the agent's perspective, given that the principal controls incentives through the payment scheme, the worst state is the one in which the principal provides him no incentives to perform and the production state turns out to be the worst, that is, e i = 0 and v i = −c. 14 In the remaining analysis we focus on the case when the liquidity constraint is binding in the lowest possible state. Therefore, the principal will set 14 Recall that the liquidity constraint is an institutional constraint which prohibits penalizing the agent for obtaining a low output, and it should hold regardless of whether the contract is optimal or not. The agent's optimal response under the contract should not be included in the calculation of the required base wage, because we cannot assume the optimal contract in setting up the constraint. Instead, the constraint determines the agent's optimal response under contract and the optimal contract. By setting effort at the lowest possible level, and by setting the state at the worst possible realization, we can ensure that the piece rate contract always satisfies the agent's liquidity constraint. Note that under tournaments, instead, and given the homogeneity of agents, efforts cancel out of the payment calculation.
The expected utility for the agent is
To provide correct incentives to the agent, the principal calculates the effort level e i that maximizes (18). First order conditions yield
and, because neither
can be equal to zero, it follows that
The principal's profit per agent
Maximizing the expected profit with respect to β R yields
Hence, given the contractual variables and the optimal effort level for the agent, the expected profit per agent is
Note that condition (22) indicates that the principal will make an offer only if w is relatively low, otherwise production is unprofitable. Given conditions (17) and (21), the individual rationality constraint requires 
Given that c > 0, (24) is equivalent to
A closed form solution for β R is impossible to obtain from (25). As a result we have to rely on computational methods in order to determine the piece rate values β R which are individually rational. Our computations proceed as follows: we derive the contractual variables from Eqs. (17) and (21) assuming that the liquidity constraint is binding in the lowest state and ignoring the individual rationality constraint. Then we check if the individual rationality constraint (23) is satisfied by the solution (in which case it is non-binding) or if it is violated (in which case it is binding). If (23) is found to be binding, then the piece rate β R is derived by the solution of (25) using a Newton algorithm and b R is still determined by (17). In this case, when we have multiple solutions for β R , we keep the one maximizing the principal's profit. If (23) is found to be non-binding we keep the solutions from Eqs. (17) and (21).
Tournaments
Next, we turn to the tournament case. Recall that under the tournament the compensation to each agent is
, which can be written as
with e denoting the average effort and ε denoting the average idiosyncratic shock. Given that the agents are homogeneous, the contract is uniform for all agents and the optimal effort level is equal in equilibrium for all agents. 15 Thus, the compensation to each agent can be expressed as
As shown in the proof of Lemma 2, 15 Skaperdas and Gan (1995) have shown that if the agents are heterogeneous in their risk-aversion rates, then, their equilibrium effort can be sensitive to the risk-aversion rate. In a model with limited liability for the agents, they show that the more risk-averse agent exerts higher effort as insurance against loss. Instead of heterogeneous agents, Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) assume that agents are identical and examine the effects of risk-aversion on rent-seeking and rent-augmenting expenditures to show that risk-aversion may have ambiguous effects on expenditures in rent-seeking contests. Our analysis indicates that our results are qualitatively correct provided that the agents are risk-averse, but they depend quantitatively on the risk-aversion rate.
Similar to piece rates, if the liquidity constraint is binding in the lowest state, then it is non-binding in all states, because the payment under tournament is also increasing in the state. The agent's expected utility is
The effort level that maximizes the agent's expected utility satisfies
Because the product of the first two terms in the equation cannot be equal to zero, it follows that
Given Lemma 2, which states that the individual rationality constraint is always binding under tournaments with liquidity constraints, the principal chooses the value of the bonus factor β T that satisfies the agent's individual rationality constraint with equality. Thus, (26 ), (27) and (28) imply
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Note that in equilibrium the random variable
Then, (29) becomes
Clearly, similar to the piece rate case, Eq. (30) has no closed form solution.
A solution can only be obtained by computational methods (recall that we use a Newton algorithm). The principal's profit per agent is
Hence, given the optimal base payment and the optimal effort level for the agent, the expected profit per agent is
where β T can only be determined numerically by solving (30).
The dominant contract under liquidity constraints
The principal's decision about which compensation scheme to offer depends entirely on expected profits. Clearly, under both schemes, expected profits decline when a liquidity constraint is introduced in addition to the other constraints. Our analysis indicates that these profits decline faster under piece rates as the liquidity constraint becomes tighter. The intuition behind our result is that the liquidity constraint distorts the agent's incentives to perform because it reduces the penalty the principal can impose for unfavorable outcomes. Therefore, the principal needs to provide higherpower incentives. By filtering common shocks from the responsibility of the agent, tournaments make the agent more tolerant to higher-power incentives, hence, it is easier for the principal to implement higher-power incentives under tournament than under piece rates. Moreover, the piece rate β R cannot exceed 1 (i.e., because marginal
(c) Fig. 1 The expected profit per agent and the contractual variables for the piece rate contract and the tournament cost cannot exceed marginal revenue). By contrast, the bonus factor β T can exceed 1 which enables the implementation of higher-power incentives. Figure 1 illustrates that tournaments are dominant over piece rates when liquidity constraints are introduced. In particular, panel (a) shows that expected profit is always strictly larger under tournament regardless of the value of w, that is, regardless of how tight the liquidity constraint is. Note that in our numerical analysis (see Appendix A), the results of which are depicted in Fig. 1 , we assume that [n/(n − 1)]d < c. That is, we assume that common uncertainty is sufficiently large relative to the idiosyncratic uncertainty. As shown in Appendix A, we use the parameter set a = 10, n = 100, c = 3, d = 0.5, however, the results are qualitatively the same for any parameters satisfying the regularity conditions [n/(n − 1)]d < c and [n/(n − 1)]d < a. For the case without liquidity constraints expected profits per agent are calculated by using conditions (7) and (14). For the case with binding liquidity constraints expected profits per agent are calculated by using condition (20) where β R is determined either by (21) or by the numerical solution of (25), and condition (31) where, again, β T is determined numerically by (30). Obviously, for the range over which the liquidity constraint is non-binding, expected profit is flat and independent of w. We confirmed this result for all possible values of common uncertainty that satisfy condition (15). A sufficient increase in the minimum permissible wage w decreases the expected profit under both schemes, but it does so much faster under piece rates. In fact, piece rates cannot be defined at all after a critical value of w is passed (see point B in panel (a)), because the principal needs to offer a piece rate larger than 1 to provide correct incentives to the agent. However, given that β R cannot exceed 1, piece rates cannot be defined. 17 In interpreting the results depicted in Fig. 1 , note that for w in the range up to A the individual rationality constraint under piece rates is binding and the liquidity constraint is non-binding. For w in the AB range the individual rationality constraint under piece rates is binding or non-binding and the liquidity constraint is binding. Under tournaments, the individual rationality constraint is always binding (see Lemma 2). Lastly, for w in the range up to C the limited liability constraint under tournament is non-binding.
Again, in our numerical analysis we assume that common uncertainty is relatively large, that is, [n/(n − 1)]d < c. If, instead, common uncertainty were relatively low, that is, if [n/(n − 1)]d > c, absent a liquidity constraint for the agent the tournament would be suboptimal, as condition (15) indicates. In terms of adjustments to panel (a) in Fig. 1 , expected profit under piece rates would be higher up to point A. Recall that the piece rate is not defined beyond point B. Further, over range AB, expected profit under tournaments is shown by condition (14), and expected profit under piece rates is shown by condition (22) if the individual rationality constraint under piece rates is non-binding. Thus, expected profit under tournament would be larger if
Hence, if u − w is sufficiently small, the principal will still find it optimal to switch to a tournament even though common uncertainty is relatively low, primarily for the sake of satisfying the liquidity constraint. That is, the liquidity constraint can reverse the preferences of the principal. Appendix B provides the numerical analysis when the individual rationality constraint under piece rates is binding, instead. This analysis also supports the finding above. 18 Panel (b) indicates that the base payment is always larger (and positive) under tournament, but it increases with w, that is, when the minimum acceptable payment increases the base payment must also increase to provide correct incentives to the agent to participate. As mentioned earlier, the rationale behind the positive b T and the negative b R is that the expected bonus payment under tournament is zero, whereas that under piece rate is positive. Therefore, agents expect to be compensated for effort through the base payment in a tournament. Under piece rates the bonus also compensates the agents for their effort costs. In fact, the expected bonus exceeds the cost of effort and the base payment is negative. Further, panel (c) indicates that both the piece rate β R and the bonus factor β T increase when w increases and the liquidity constraint is binding. There are two reasons for this: First, because the base payment increases when w increases, the principal must provide the agents with higher-power incentives in order to exert more effort and make up in lost profit due to the increase in the base payment. Second, when w increases, the principal provides the agents with higher-power incentives in order to minimize the likelihood that output is low and the principal is forced by the liquidity constraint to pay the minimum acceptable wage to the agent when, absent the constraint, it would have been optimal to pay less or impose a penalty. Again, note that piece rates are not defined for a piece rate above 1, whereas under tournaments the principal can continue to provide incentives to the agents through a bonus factor larger than 1, which explains the increased dominance of tournaments over piece rates for large values of the minimum acceptable payment w.
Piece rates and tournaments with risk-neutrality
We now simplify our model by assuming that the agents are risk-neutral. Relaxing risk-aversion allows us to obtain closed form solutions for the contractual parameters even with liquidity constraints. Under risk-neutrality and without liquidity constraints, the determination of the optimal bonus factor for both the piece rate and the tournament leads to trivial results, especially because the provision of insurance is a major issue in contrasting piece rates to tournaments. This is the reason why our baseline model includes risk-aversion for the agents, even though a closed form solution cannot be obtained. The analysis with risk-neutrality and liquidity constraints, however, conforms with our findings for the more interesting risk-averse case. Agent preferences are represented by u (w i , e i ) = w i − e 2 i 2a . We assume that both production shocks η and ε i follow identical and independent distributions with zero means. The support of η + ε i is [−c, c] and the support of ε i is [−d, d] . We start with the case of no liquidity constraints for the agents.
Under a piece rate contract w i = b R + β R x i , the agent's utility is
hence, his expected utility is
.
123
Maximizing expected utility with respect to e i yields a condition identical to (2) above. The agent's individual rationality constraint then implies
The principal's expected profit per agent is
Maximizing with respect to β R yields
The intuition is that when agents are risk-averse, the optimal choice under piece rates is the solution of "selling the enterprise to the agent" (i.e., a piece rate of 1 so that, in light of moral hazard, the agent assumes all the risk). It follows that
and expected profit per agent at the optimum piece rate is
Under a tournament w
, the agent's utility is:
Maximizing expected utility with respect to e i yields a condition identical to (9) above. The agent's individual rationality constraint then implies
123
Maximizing with respect to β T yields
Hence,
and expected profit per agent at the optimum tournament is
which is identical to that under piece rates. The intuition here is that when the agents are risk-neutral the principal cannot charge them a risk-premium for removing common uncertainty from their responsibility, and the contract induces the agents to exert the same effort e i = a they would exert under piece rates. This result conforms with the Lazear and Rosen (1981) finding that both piece rates and tournaments are equally efficient with risk-neutral agents. 19 We continue with the case of liquidity constraints for the agents. In this case, under piece rates, it follows that
Thus, in the worst state of nature, the liquidity constraint must satisfy
If w satisfies this inequality, the optimal piece rate contract is the one determined above without liquidity constraints. By contrast, for a sufficiently large w, the liquidity constraint is binding. Thus,
while the optimal effort is still given by (2). Expected profit per agent satisfies
Maximizing with respect to β R implies
It can be shown that the individual rationality constraint yields
If the individual rationality constraint is binding, β R is calculated from the constraint with equality. That is,
because β R cannot be negative and provide correct incentives. Under tournaments, the liquidity constraint implies
Given agent homogeneity, it follows that
If w satisfies this inequality, the optimal tournament contract is the one determined above without liquidity constraints. Similar to the piece rate case, the liquidity constraint is binding for a sufficiently large w. Thus,
while the optimal effort is still given by (9). Expected profit per agent satisfies
where, similar to Lemma 2 above, we assume that the regularity condition n−1 n a−d > 0 holds. If the individual rationality constraint is binding, β T is calculated from the con-straint with equality. That is,
because the principal will obviously choose the highest-power incentives that are feasible.
To summarize the analysis with risk-neutral agents, the optimal piece rate under liquidity constraints for the agents is determined according to the following procedure:
then the liquidity constraint is always non-binding (while the individual rationality constraint is binding) and the optimal piece rate contract is the one determined above without a liquidity constraint. Otherwise, we continue with step (iii).
2 aβ R ≥ u −w, then the individual rationality constraint is non binding (while the liquidity constraint is binding) and the optimal piece rate contract is the one calculated in step (iii). Otherwise, we continue with step (v).
, which define the optimal piece rate contract in this case (where all constraints are binding). The expected profit per agent can then be calculated as
The related procedure under tournaments is:
then the liquidity constraint is always non-binding (while the individual rationality constraint is binding) and the optimal tournament contract is the one determined above without a liquidity constraint. Otherwise, we continue with step (iii).
and b T = w + β T d, which define the optimal tournament contract in this case (where all constraints are binding). The expected profit per agent can then be calculated as
Figure 2 summarizes the findings of the risk-neutral agent case. As Fig. 2 shows, expected profit is identical for piece rates and tournaments when the liquidity constraints are non-binding, however, when the liquidity constraints are binding, expected profit under tournaments is higher. These findings enhance the generality and robustness of our main result.
Conclusion
A familiar result in the principal-agent literature is that when agents are risk averse and production is subject to relatively large common shocks the tournament is a superior compensation scheme to the piece rate. The superiority of tournaments over piece rates may not survive under liquidity constraints. Prior research (for instance, Tsoulouhas and Vukina 1999; Marinakis and Tsoulouhas 2009 for limited liability on the principal) would lead someone to expect the same result even when limited liability is imposed on the agent instead of the principal. In addition, one might also expect that limited liability would make the agents more tolerant to risk (in the sense that liquidity constraints convexify the agent's utility function) and the principal less tolerant to risk (in the sense that the principal cares about the allocation of payments across states in order to satisfy the liquidity constraints). The reduced interest of agents in getting insurance, as well as the reduced ability of the principal to provide it, might diminish the scope for tournaments. However, there is a fundamental difference between limited liability on the principal side and limited liability on the agent side. Under limited liability for the principal, the agents cannot be suckered by the prospect of payments the principal cannot make, therefore, a limited liability constraint is introduced to put a maximum on the payment to the agents in low states. Liquidity constraints for the agents, instead, put a minimum on the payments to the agents in low states. Our analysis builds on this fact to show that in the presence of common uncertainty a principal contracting with risk averse agents will prefer to offer a tournament even when agents are liquidity constrained.
The rationale for our result is that by providing insurance against common shocks through a cardinal tournament, so that payments to the agents in unfavorable states increase and payments in favorable states decrease, the principal can satisfy tight liquidity constraints for the agents without paying any ex ante rents to them while simultaneously providing them with higher-power incentives than under piece rates. The larger the minimum payment satisfying an agent's liquidity constraint, the higher the power of incentives the principal provides. In other words, the principal counterbalances the increase in the base payment, which is required to satisfy the liquidity constraint, with higher-power incentives in order to curb agent rents and in order to reduce the likelihood that output is low. Tournaments provide the principal with added flexibility in the determination of this power. Author's personal copy Are tournaments optimal under liquidity constraints? Table 2 Parameter values: a = 10, n = 100, c Author's personal copy K. Marinakis, T. Tsoulouhas Table 2 continued Minimum Author's personal copy Are tournaments optimal under liquidity constraints? Table 2 continued Minimum 
